Darryl McElroy v. Sands Casino by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-21-2014 
Darryl McElroy v. Sands Casino 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Darryl McElroy v. Sands Casino" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 1185. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/1185 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
   









SANDS CASINO  
 
      
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District Pennsylvania 
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Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: November 21, 2014) 
   
O P I N I O N* 
   
     
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 Appellant Darryl McElroy appeals from the District Court’s grant of Appellee 
Sands Casino’s motions for summary judgment and to strike McElroy’s opposition to 
summary judgment. We affirm because there were no genuine disputes of material fact 
and because the District Court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to strike.  
 Factual Background 
 McElroy worked for Sands Casino (“Sands”). In the Fall of 2011, McElroy 
contacted Stacey Berasley, a Sands employee who handles benefits inquiries, to inquire 
about Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave. Berasley referred McElroy to Las 
Vegas Sands Corp. Leave Administration (“Leave Administration”), an outside 
organization that handles leave issues for Sands. In accordance with her typical practice, 
Berasley did not tell anyone about McElroy’s inquiry. On December 15, 2011, Leave 
Administration told McElroy that his form was incomplete. McElroy never supplemented 
the information because Sands terminated him on December 19, 2011.  
 Sands terminated McElroy after investigating an incident that occurred on 
December 10, 2011 between McElroy and another Sands employee named Paul Lee. On  
that date, while entering an elevator with Lee, McElroy grabbed Lee’s shoulder with one 
hand and grabbed or prodded him in the waist or lower back with the other hand, pushing 
Lee onto the elevator. Lee expressed anger and told McElroy not to touch him again, but 
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McElroy touched him again when they exited the elevator. Sands investigated the 
elevator incident and terminated McElroy.1  
 The Sands employee handbook describes a peer review procedure for appealing 
terminations. McElroy requested peer review, but Sands denied it because the termination 
involved sexual harassment, which is excepted from peer review.2 The handbook also 
states that it does not create a contract for employment or benefits.  
 After his termination, McElroy filed suit against Sands, asserting claims for breach 
of his contractual right to peer review and for violation of his FMLA rights.  
 Sands filed a motion for summary judgment. McElroy filed an opposition brief 
that exceeded the permissible page limit 21 days later. Sands filed a motion to strike 
McElroy’s opposition, asserting that McElroy failed to attach an unemployment hearing 
transcript referenced in his opposition brief, filed his opposition brief late, and exceeded 
the page limit.  
 The District Court granted the motion to strike, holding that the transcript should 
have been produced as supplemental discovery and that McElroy’s opposition brief was 
untimely because it was not filed within 14 days pursuant to Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania Local Rule 7.1(c). The practical effect of the District Court’s grant of the 
motion to strike is unclear. The District Court noted that “[t]hough striking the opposition 
                                              
1 Before Sands employed McElroy and Lee, McElroy had grabbed Lee’s nipple when they were both at dealer 
school. And McElroy had been previously disciplined for inappropriate comments to female coworkers regarding a 
massage, for ordering alcohol at Sands while in uniform contrary to Sands’ policy, and for making rude comments 
to another dealer. 
2 McElroy claims that the elevator incident was not sexual harassment and therefore that Sands improperly denied 
him peer review. This argument is immaterial because, as explained below, the handbook did not give him any 
contractual right to peer review. Furthermore, even if the elevator incident was not sexual harassment, the handbook 
specifies that Sands has the right to change its policies and benefits without prior notice and that Sands may make 
exceptions, at its discretion, to the policies. 
4 
 
may seem like harsh punishment for counsel’s behavior, having reviewed the summary 
judgment opposition papers in connection with the motion to strike, the Court is 
confident nothing raised therein would seriously affect the outcome of the summary 
judgment analysis . . . .” (Dist. Ct. Op. 6.) Thus, it appears that the District Court 
considered McElroy’s opposition brief to some extent in any event.  
 The District Court granted Sands’ motion for summary judgment because, even 
though McElroy’s FMLA inquiry and his termination were temporally close, “there 
surely can be no causal relationship between an FMLA request and a termination, and 
any temporal proximity cannot be considered suggestive, if the party making the 
termination decision had no knowledge of the FMLA request.” (Dist. Ct. Op. 7.) The 
District Court noted that none of the employees involved in the termination decision 
knew about McElroy’s FMLA request; the only Sands employee who knew was 
Berasley, who declared that she did not tell anyone else, and that declaration was not 
challenged or rebutted. The District Court concluded that “[n]othing in the record could 
support a jury’s determination that anyone else knew; therefore, the retaliation claim fails 
as a matter of law.” (Dist. Ct. Op. 9.) The District Court also held that McElroy’s breach 
of contract claim failed because there was no contract, and the handbook did not show 
any intent on Sands’ part to supplant Pennsylvania’s at-will employment rule; to the 
contrary, the handbook evidenced Sands’ intent to enforce the at-will rule.  
 On appeal, McElroy argues that the motion to strike should have been denied 
because 21 days was an appropriate response time for a motion for summary judgment, 
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the District Court failed to apply the Poulis factors in granting the motion to strike,3 and 
he did not commit multiple errors. He also argues that summary judgment was improper 
because Sands management must have known about his FMLA inquiry either directly or 
constructively, and the timing between his FMLA request and his termination is 
obviously suggestive. In addition, he claims that Sands breached its contractual 
obligation to provide peer review before terminating him.   
Discussion 
 “We review the District Court’s decision [grant]ing the motion to strike for an 
abuse of discretion.” Meditz v. City of Newark, 658 F.3d 364, 367 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011). The 
District Court did not abuse its discretion. McElroy filed his opposition late, it was overly 
long, and it was incomplete because it did not include the necessary transcript. We 
conclude that the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment for Sands. 
“We review the District Court’s order granting summary judgment de novo.” Id. at 369.4  
 “To prevail on a retaliation claim under the FMLA, the plaintiff must prove that 
(1) [he] invoked h[is] right to FMLA-qualifying leave, (2) [he] suffered an adverse 
employment decision, and (3) the adverse action was causally related to h[is] invocation 
of rights.” Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 301-02 (3d Cir. 
2012). To establish a prima facie case, McElroy “must point to evidence in the record 
sufficient to create a genuine factual dispute about . . . (a) invocation of an FMLA right, 
                                              
3 Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. lists factors to consider in deciding whether to dismiss a case as a sanction. 
747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). It is inapplicable because the District Court did not dismiss McElroy’s case as a 
sanction; it granted a motion to strike and then adjudicated the motion for summary judgment, while giving 
consideration to McElroy’s arguments.  
4 McElroy questions which documents the District Court reviewed in adjudicating the summary judgment motion 
after granting the motion to strike. Because our review is de novo, that question is moot.  
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(b) termination, and (c) causation.” Id. at 302. If there is a prima facie case, “the burden 
of production shifts to [Sands] to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 
its decision.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). If Sands meets that burden, McElroy “must 
point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could 
reasonably . . . disbelieve [Sands’] articulated legitimate reasons.” Id. (omission in 
original) (quotation marks omitted). 
 McElroy cannot establish a prima facie case because he cannot show causation. 
He has not pointed to any evidence that the decision-makers who investigated the 
elevator incident and decided to terminate him knew about his FMLA inquiry. “To the 
extent that [McElroy] relies upon the brevity of the time periods between the protected 
activity and alleged retaliatory actions to prove causation, he will have to show as well 
that the decision maker had knowledge of the protected activity.” Moore v. City of 
Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 351 (3d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). Furthermore, even if 
he had shown a prima facie case, he has not pointed to any evidence that could cause a 
reasonable jury to disbelieve Sands’ proffered reason for the termination so as to 
establish pretext. McElroy does not dispute that the elevator incident occurred. The sole 
issue is whether Sands had a legitimate, non-discriminatory, non-retaliatory reason for 
the termination. Sands investigated the elevator incident and concluded that McElroy’s 
behavior warranted termination; there is no evidence that the decision-makers knew 
about his FMLA inquiry. No reasonable factfinder could conclude, based on the evidence 
presented, that Sands’ decision was retaliatory. 
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 Furthermore, the District Court properly granted summary judgment on McElroy’s 
breach of contract claim because the employee handbook expressly disclaimed that it 
established a contractual right. Courts have rejected such claims when this disclaimer 
language alerts the employee to the employer’s intent that the policies set forth do not 
constitute a contract. E.g., Rutherfoord v. Presbyterian-Univ. Hosp., 612 A.2d 500, 504 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (“[T]his ‘disclaimer’ language in the front of the employee 
handbook . . . contains a clear expression of the Hospital’s intention that the policies 
within the Manual, including those relating to disciplinary and grievance procedures, are 
not intended to constitute a contract . . . . [A]s a matter of law, the Manual cannot be 
found to create an implied contract of employment.”).   
Conclusion  
 The District Court’s judgment is affirmed. 
